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Abstract
A pandemic of a novel Coronavirus emerged in December of 2019 (COVID-19), causing devastating public
health impact across the world. In the absence of a safe and effective vaccine or antivirals, strategies for con-
trolling and mitigating the burden of the pandemic are focused on non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as
social-distancing, contact-tracing, quarantine, isolation, and the use of face-masks in public. We develop a
new mathematical model for assessing the population-level impact of the aforementioned control and mitigation
strategies. Rigorous analysis of the model shows that the disease-free equilibrium is locally-asymptotically sta-
ble if a certain epidemiological threshold, known as the reproduction number (denoted byRc), is less than unity.
Simulations of the model, using data relevant to COVID-19 transmission dynamics in the US state of New York
and the entire US, show that the pandemic burden will peak in mid and late April, respectively. The worst-case
scenario projections for cumulative mortality (based on the baseline levels of anti-COVID non-pharmaceutical
interventions considered in the study) decrease dramatically by 80% and 64%, respectively, if the strict social-
distancing measures implemented are maintained until the end of May or June, 2020. The duration and timing
of the relaxation or termination of the strict social-distancing measures are crucially-important in determining
the future trajectory of the COVID-19 pandemic. This study shows that early termination of the strict social-
distancing measures could trigger a devastating second wave with burden similar to those projected before the
onset of the strict social-distancing measures were implemented. The use of efficacious face-masks (such as
surgical masks, with estimated efficacy ≥ 70%) in public could lead to the elimination of the pandemic if at
least 70% of the residents of New York state use such masks in public consistently (nationwide, a compliance
of at least 80% will be required using such masks). The use of low efficacy masks, such as cloth masks (of
estimated efficacy less than 30%), could also lead to significant reduction of COVID-19 burden (albeit, they are
not able to lead to elimination). Combining low efficacy masks with improved levels of the other anti-COVID-
19 intervention strategies can lead to the elimination of the pandemic. This study emphasizes the important
role social-distancing plays in curtailing the burden of COVID-19. Increases in the adherence level of social-
distancing protocols result in dramatic reduction of the burden of the pandemic, and the timely implementation
of social-distancing measures in numerous states of the US may have averted a catastrophic outcome with re-
spect to the burden of COVID-19. Using face-masks in public (including the low efficacy cloth masks) is very
useful in minimizing community transmission and burden of COVID-19, provided their coverage level is high.
The masks coverage needed to eliminate COVID-19 decreases if the masks-based intervention is combined with
the strict social-distancing strategy.
∗Corresponding author: Email: agumel@asu.edu
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1 Introduction
The world is currently facing a pandemic of a novel coronavirus (COVID-19), which started as an outbreak of
pneumonia of unknown cause in Wuhan city of China in December of 2019 [1–3]. As of April 14, 2020, COVID-
19 (caused by the novel SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus) has spread to over 210 countries and territories, causing about
1.9 million infections and 125,000 deaths [4–7]. The United States is now the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic,
(recording over 613,800 confirmed cases and 26,000 deaths) within a short time, with New York state bearing the
brunt of the US burden (over 203,000 confirmed cases and 10,800 deaths) [4–7]. The first documented confirmed
case of the novel coronavirus in the US (a resident who had recently visited Wuhan city in China) was reported
on January 20, 2020 [8], while the first confirmed case in the state of New York was reported on March 1, 2020.
Most of the COVID-19 related deaths and severe cases occur in the elderly (65 years of age and older) and people
with underlying medical conditions [9]. Younger people and frontline healthcare workers are also at high risk of
acquiring COVID-19 infection.
As with two other coronaviruses that caused major outbreaks in humans in recent years (namely, the Severe
Acute respiratory Syndrome and the Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome [2, 10]), COVID-19 is transmitted from
human-to-human through direct contact with contaminated objects or surfaces and through inhalation of respiratory
droplets from both symptomatic and asymptomatically-infectious humans [11]. There is also limited evidence that
the virus can be exhaled through normal breathing [12]. The incubation period of the disease ranges from 2-14
days, with about 97.5% of infected people developing disease symptoms within 11.5 days of infection [3, 13–15].
Most infections (over 80%) show mild or no symptoms [16]. Common symptoms of the disease include fever,
coughing and shortness of breath for mild cases, and pneumonia for severe cases [1, 2, 7]. In the absence of phar-
maceutical interventions (such as a safe and effective vaccine for use in humans and a COVID-19 anti-viral), efforts
aimed at containing COVID-19 are focused on the implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as
social-distancing, using face-masks, quarantine of suspected cases, isolation and hospitalization of confirmed cases,
contact-tracing and quarantine, mass testing, etc.
In particular, since the novel coronavirus is transmitted among people who come in close contact with each
other, the implementation of strict social-distancing measures has been the primary tool for curbing the spread of
the pandemic. As of April 7, 2020, stringent social-distancing mechanisms (mandatory lockdowns/ stay-at-home
orders) have been imposed in over 42 states of the United States, together with Washington DC, Guam, and Puerto
Rico (representing over 95% of the US population; involving approximately 316 million Americans) [17]. The state
of New York (the current epicenter for COVID-19) has even imposed a fine against people who fail to comply with
its stringent social-distancing measures that took effect March 22, 2020. Common social-distancing measures or
guidelines being employed in the US include temporary closures of schools and non-essential businesses, avoiding
crowded events and mass gatherings, moving in-person meetings online, etc. The city of Wuhan lifted its 76-day
strict lockdown on April 8, 2020 (this was done in a phased way, with the first relaxation of measures on February
9, 2020).
Contact-tracing is another major public health strategy for combating the spread of COVID-19. Contact-tracing
involves searching for, or identifying, individuals with whom the confirmed case has closely interacted within a
certain time frame (e.g., two days prior to the onset of symptoms [18]), interviewing, testing, and isolating or
hospitalizing them if they have the disease [19, 20].
The use of face-masks in public by members of the general population has historically been a common practice
to try to limit or combat the spread of respiratory diseases, dating back to at least the 1918 H1N1 pandemic of
influenza [21–26]. Face masks may have been instrumental in limiting the community spread of the 2002/2003
SARS epidemic in Asia (particularly in China, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan) [27, 28] as well as the con-
tainment of the COVID-19 pandemic in Taiwan [29]. Face-masks have dual purposes. If worn by a susceptible
individual, the mask offers efficacy against the acquisition of infection. On the other hand, if the wearer is already
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infected (but is asymptomatic or mildly-symptomatic and unaware he/she ill), the face-mask offers efficacy against
their ability to transmit infection to susceptible individuals [12, 30–33].
Predicting the course or severity of a pandemic, such as COVID-19, as well as the realistic assessment of
proposed public health intervention strategies for combating them in real time, is a major challenge to both the
public health and the scientific community. A number of models have been developed and used to study COVID-
19 dynamics. Ferguson et al. [34] used an agent-based model to investigate the effects of non-pharmaceutical
interventions on human deaths from COVID-19, and in reducing burden on healthcare facilities and equipment.
They projected that, in the absence of control measures, over 81% of the populations of the US and Great Britain
might become infected and COVID-19 may cause up to 2.2 million deaths in the US. Mizumoto and Chowell
[35] used a mathematical model and incidence data to study changes in COVID-19 transmission potential as the
outbreak progressed through the Diamond Princess. They obtained a higher reproduction number and noticed a
substantial decrease in the effective reproduction number after improved quarantine was instituted. Hellewell et
al. [36] used a stochastic model with COVID-19 data to examine the impact of contact-tracing and isolation on
disease control, and suggested that for most instances COVID-19 spread can be contained in 3 months if these
measures are highly effective. Using a stochastic model, Kucharski et al. [37] examined the COVID-19 trajectory
in Wuhan from January-February 2020, showing a reduction in transmission (a 1.3 reduction in the associated
effective reproduction number of the model) when travel restrictions were implemented. Consequently, there is a
need to examine the combined impact of multiple non-pharmaceutical interventions applied together or in sequence.
The present study is based on the development of a new mathematical model for studying the transmission
dynamics and control of the COVID-19 pandemic in the US (particularly in the state of New York, the epicenter
of COVID-19). The model takes the form of a Kermack-McKendrick, compartmental, deterministic system of
nonlinear differential equations [38]. It incorporates features pertinent to COVID-19 transmission dynamics and
control, such as the quarantine of suspected cases and the isolation/hospitalization of confirmed COVID-19 cases
(similar to the models developed in [39–41]). The model, parameterized using available COVID-19 mortality data
(more reliable than case data, provides a realistic real-time assessment and estimate of the burden of the pandemic
in the US state of New York, in addition to assessing some of the main intervention strategies being implemented in
the state (in particular, quarantine, isolation, contact-tracing, social-distancing and the use of face-masks in public).
2 Materials and Method
2.1 Formulation of Mathematical Model
We designed and analyzed a novel Kermack-McKendrick-type mathematical model for the transmission dynam-
ics and control of COVID-19 in a population [38]. The model, which incorporates the main non-pharmaceutical
interventions being implemented to curtail COVID-19 transmission in a community (such as social-distancing,
quarantine of suspected cases, isolation of confirmed cases, contact-tracing, testing and use of face-masks in pub-
lic), is formulated based on stratifying the total human population at time t, denoted by N(t), into the mutually-
exclusive compartments of non-quarantined susceptible (Su(t)), quarantined susceptible (Sq(t)), non-quarantined
exposed (i.e., newly-infected individuals who do not yet show symptoms of the disease and cannot transmit in-
fection, Eu(t)), quarantined exposed (Eq(t)), symptomatically-infectious (Iu(t)), asymptomatically-infectious
(Ia(t)), hospitalized/isolated (Ih(t)), intensive care patients (Iicu(t)) and recovered (R(t)), so that
N(t) = Su(t) + Sq(t) +Eu(t) + Eq(t) + Iu(t) + Ia(t) + Ih(t) + Iicu(t) +R(t).
It should be mentioned that the asymptomatically-infectious compartment (Ia) also includes those with mild symp-
toms of COVID-19. Data from the World Health Organization shows that about 80% of COVID-19 confirmed
cases show mild or no symptoms [16], and that individuals in this category (particularly those who are in the 65+
age group or those with pre-existing health conditions) can develop a mild form of pneumonia that might require
self-isolation or hospitalization [42–45]. Furthermore, some individuals in this compartment (particularly those
who show no clinical symptoms [46]) can be detected (via testing and/or tracing and testing of the contacts of
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confirmed COVID-19 cases) and sent to self-isolation or hospitalization. It is worth mentioning that, although the
self-isolation or hospitalization of individuals in the Ia class is associated with contact-tracing, the Ia to Ih tran-
sition can also result from improvement in (or scaling up of) testing as is the case in Iceland [47]. In fact, in our
study, contact tracing is very much inter-linked with testing. Contact tracing is carried out after a confirmed case is
diagnosed (following testing/diagnosis of a confirmed case). Furthermore, individuals in the quarantine class (Sq or
Eq) are those who have been traced, following the positive diagnosis of someone they have had close contact with
(i.e., a confirmed COVID-19 case they have been exposed to). People in quarantine can be susceptible or newly-
infected (but unaware of their infection) status, and are continually monitored (tested) to determine their status.
Those who test positive are moved to the Eq class, and those who remain negative after the incubation period are
returned to the Su class. Thus, the process of quarantining individuals suspected of having had close contacts with
an infectious individual can be interpreted as contact-tracing. In addition to contact-tracing (of contacts of con-
firmed cases), people can be placed in quarantine because of other factors, such as having travelled to areas with
high COVID-19 transmission (e.g., New York, Italy, China, Spain, UK, etc.) Quarantine and isolation can either
be at home (self-quarantine and self-isolation) or at designated healthcare facilities. Furthermore, hospitalization
in the context of this study includes self-isolation at home and isolation at the hospital (hence, hospitalization and
isolation will be used interchangeably in this study).
The model is given by the following deterministic system of nonlinear differential equations (where a dot
represents differentiation with respect to time).
S˙u = −[(1− p) + (1− q)p+ qp]λSu + ψqSq,
S˙q = (1− p)λSu − (θjλ+ ψq)Sq,
E˙u = (1− q)pλSu − (σu + αu)Eu,
E˙q = qpλSu + αuEu + θjλSq − σqEq,
I˙u = f1σuEu − (γu + φu + δu)Iu,
I˙h = f2σuEu + rσqEq + φuIu + σaIa − (γh + νh + δh)Ih,
I˙a = (1− f1 − f2)σuEu + (1− r)σqEq − (γa + σa + δa)Ia,
I˙icu = νhIh − (γicu + δicu)Iicu,
R˙ = γuIu + γhIh + γaIa + γicuIicu,
(2.1)
where force of infection λ is defined as:
λ =
β(1− ǫMcM )(Iu + ηaIa + ηhIh)
N − θq(Eq + Ih + Iicu)
,
where β is the effective contact rate (i.e., contacts capable of leading to COVID-19 transmission), 0 < cM ≤
1 is the proportion of members of the public who wear face-masks (correctly and consistently) in public and
0 < ǫM ≤ 1 is the efficacy of the face-masks (low values of cM imply limited use of face-masks by members
of the public, while values of cM that are closer to unity imply widespread/universal use of face-masks in the
community). Furthermore, values of ǫM that are closer to zero imply that the face-masks are not very effective
in preventing acquisition (if worn by a susceptible human) or transmitting infection (if worn by a symptomatic
or asymptomatically-infectious human), while ǫM close, or equal to, unity implies that the face-masks used by
the members of the public are of near or perfect efficacy against the acquisition or transmission of infection.
Reduction in the contact rate parameter (β) can be thought of a measure of effectiveness of strategies that limit
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contacts between people (to avoid community transmission), notably social (or physical) distancing. The parameter
0 < ηa < 1measures the relative infectiousness of asymptomatically-infectious humans (in the Ia class) in relation
to symptomatic individuals (in the Iu class). Similarly, 0 < ηh < 1 is a modification parameter accounting for the
relative infectiousness of hospitalized/isolated infectious humans (in the Ih class) in relation to individuals in the Iu
class. The parameter 0 < θq ≤ 1 is a measure of the effectiveness of quarantine, hospitalization/isolation and ICU
admission to prevent infected quarantined, hospitalized/isolated individuals and ICU patients from transmitting
infection. In particular, θq = 0 implies that infected quarantined, hospitalized/isolated individuals and ICU patients
mix freely with the rest of population and can transmit at the same rate as other infectious individuals. On the other
hand, θq = 1 implies that the efficacy of quarantine, hospitalization/isolation and ICU admission (in preventing
infected quarantined, hospitalized/isolated individuals and ICU patients from transmitting infection) is perfect. In
other words, θq = 1 means infected quarantined, hospitalized/isolated infectious humans and ICU patients are no
longer part of the actively-mixing population (hence, do not contribute to disease transmission).
In the model (2.1), the parameter 0 < p ≤ 1 is the probability of infection per contact, while q is the proportion
of non-quarantined individuals that are infected at the time of quarantine. The parameter ψq measures the rate at
which quarantined-susceptible individuals revert to the wholly-susceptible non-quarantined class (Su) at the end
of the quarantine period. The modification parameter 0 ≤ θj ≤ 1 is a measure of the efficacy of quarantine
to prevent the acquisition of infection by quarantined-susceptible individuals (during quarantine). It should be
mentioned that, in the formulation of the model (2.1), the quarantine rate is defined as a function of the proportion
of infectious individuals in the community (in particular, the quarantine rate of susceptible individuals is (1− p)λ,
while that of newly-infected exposed individuals in the Eq class is qpλ, where λ is the force of infection). In other
words, the more the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in a community, the more the number of residents of that
community that are quarantined. The parameters σu(σq) is the rate at which exposed non-quarantined (quarantined)
individuals progress to the symptomatic (hospitalized) class (i.e., 1/σu and 1/σq is the intrinsic incubation period
of non-quarantined and quarantined exposed individuals, respectively). A proportion, f1, of exposed individuals
move to the Iu class at the end of the incubation period (at the rate f1σu). Similarly, another proportion, f2,
moves to Ih class (at the rate f2σu, and the remaining proportion, 1 − (f1 + f2) moves to the Ia class (at the rate
[1 − (f1 + f2)]σu; noting that f1 + f2 < 1). The parameter σa represents the rate at which asymptomatically-
infectious humans are detected (via contact-tracing) and hospitalized. The parameter σa represents the rate at
which asymptomatically-infectious humans are detected (via contact-tracing) and hospitalized. A proportion, r, of
exposed quarantined individuals move to the Ih class at the end of the incubation period (at a rate rσq), while the
remaining proportion, 1−r, moves to the Ia class (at a rate (1−r)σq). The parameter αu represents the rate at which
exposed non-quarantined individuals are detected (by contact-tracing) and placed in quarantine. The parameter
γu(γa)(γh)(γicu) is the recovery rate for individuals in the Iu(Ia)(Ih)(Iicu) class, while νh is the rate at which
hospitalized individuals are placed into ICU. Furthermore, the parameter δu(δa)(δh)(δicu) represents the COVID-
induced mortality for individuals in the Iu(Ia)(Ih)(Iicu) class. It is worth mentioning that, in the formulation of
the model (2.1), the community transmission rate, β, is assumed to be the same for both the symptomatically-
infectious (Iu) and the asymptomatically-infectious (Ia) classes. It may be possible that the community contact
rate for asymptomatically-infectious individuals is higher than that of symptomatically-infectious individuals. This
is due to the fact that the former are less sick (or are not even aware that they are infected), and may, therefore,
be having more contacts, and causing more infections. The assumption for the homogeneity in the community
contact rate allows for a more tractable assessment of the impact of social-distancing and other community contact
reduction strategies, as well as mathematical tractability.
The model (2.1) is an extension of the quarantine model for Ebola viral disease developed by Denes and Gumel
[39] (by adding epidemiological compartments for asymptomatically-infectious humans and hospitalized individ-
uals in ICU, as well as incorporating contact-tracing of suspected cases and the use of face-masks by members
of the general public). To the authors’ knowledge, this may be the first deterministic model for COVID-19 that
incorporates five non-pharmaceutical interventions (quarantine, isolation, contact-tracing, use of public masks, and
social-distancing), in addition to allowing for the assessment of the impact of asymptomatic transmission on the
trajectory and burden of COVID-19 (by adding a compartment for asymptomatic-infectious humans). A flow di-
agram of the model is depicted in Figure 1, and the state variables and parameters of the model are tabulated in
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Tables 1 and 2).
To keep track of COVID-19 related deaths (required for calibrating our model with cumulative death data for
COVID-19, and for quantifying and predicting the public health impact/burden of disease), we define the book-
keeping state variable D(t) to measure the number of COVID-deceased individuals. It then follows from some of
the equations of the model (2.1) that the rate of change of the population of deceased-individuals is given by:
D˙ = δuIu + δhIh + δaIa + δicuIicu. (2.2)
Figure 1: Flow diagram of the model (2.1) showing the transition of individuals between mutually-exclusive com-
partments based on disease status.
Table 1: Description of state variables of the COVID-19 model.
State variable Description
Su Population of non-quarantined susceptible individuals
Sq Population of quarantined susceptible individuals
Eu Population of non-quarantined exposed individuals (infected but not showing symptoms
and cannot transmit infection)
Eq Population of quarantined exposed individuals (infected but not showing symptoms and
cannot transmit infection)
Iu Population of symptomatically-infectious (non-hospitalized/isolated) individuals
Ih Population of symptomatically-infectious isolated (self/hospitalized) individuals
Ia Population of asymptomatically-infectious individuals with mild or no clinical symptoms
of COVID-19
Iicu Population of individuals in intensive care unit (ICU)
R Population of recovered individuals
2.2 Baseline values of model parameters
We estimated the baseline epidemiological parameters of the model from available COVID-19 data and sources
from the published literature. Since the generally recommended period for quarantine of people suspected of being
exposed to COVID-19 is 14 days [6, 16], we set the rate at which quarantined susceptible individuals revert to
the non-quarantined susceptible class (ψq) to be ψq = 1/14 per day. Further, whiel some studies have estimated
the incubation period for COVID-19 to range from 2-14 days, with about 97.5% of infected people developing
disease symptoms within 11.5 days of infection [13–15], other studies have estimated the incubation period to
be 5-6 days [3]. We consider an average incubation period (taken from these ranges) of 5.1 days, so that σu =
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Table 2: Description of the parameters of the model(2.1).
Parameter Description
β Effective contact rate (a measure of social-distancing effectiveness)
cM Proportion of members of public who wear masks in public (i.e., masks compliance)
ǫM Efficacy of face-masks to prevent acquisition of infection by susceptible individuals
p Probability of infection per contact
q Proportion of infected humans quarantined at time of exposure
ψq Rate at which quarantined individuals revert to the susceptible class (1/ψq is the average
duration in quarantine).
ηa(ηh) Modification parameter for the assumed reduced infectiousness of asymptomatically-
infectious (hospitalized/isolated) humans (0 ≤ ηa, ηh < 1)
θj Efficacy of quarantine to prevent acquisition of infection during quarantine (0 ≤ θj < 1).
1
σu
( 1
σq
) Incubation period for non-quarantined (quarantined) exposed individuals
σa Rate at which asymptomatically-infectious humans are detected (via contact-tracing) and
hospitalized/isolated
αu Rate at which exposed non-quarantined individuals are detected (via contact-tracing) and
placed in quarantine
f1(f2) Proportion of exposed non-quarantined individuals who progress to the Iu(Ih) class at the
end of the incubation period (f1 + f2 ≤ 1)
1− (f1 + f2) Proportion of exposed non-quarantined individuals who progress to the Ia class
γu(γh)(γa)(γicu) Recovery rate for individuals in the Iu(Ih)(Ia)(Iicu) class
δu(δh)(δa)(δicu) Disease-induced mortality rate for individuals in the Iu(Ih)(Ia)(Iicu) class
φu Hospitalization rate of non-quarantined infectious individuals
r(1− r) Proportion of exposed quarantined individuals who are hospitalized (not hospitalized) at the
end of the incubation period, (i.e., move to the Ih(Ia) class)
θq Efficacy of quarantine, hospitalization/isolation and ICU admission to prevent infected indi-
viduals in quarantine, hospital/isolation and ICU from transmitting infection (0 ≤ θq ≤ 1)
σq = 1/5.1 per day [13]. Similarly, we set the progression rate from the asymptomatically-infectious class (Ia) to
the isolated/hospitalized class (Ih)to be σa = 1/4 per day. Following [34, 48], we consider an infectious period
of about 10 days, so that the recovery rate from COVID-19 infection (γ) is set to γu = γicu = 1/10 per day.
Ferguson et al. [34] estimated the average time COVID-19 patients spent in hospital (for infections that do not lead
to complications requiring ICU admission) to be about 8 days. Therefore, we set γh = 1/8 per day. Furthermore,
following Ferguson et al.[34], it is assumed that there is a short time lag (of about 5 days) between the onset of
disease symptoms in non-quarantined humans and hospitalization. Hence, we set the hospitalization rate (φu) to
be φu = 1/5 per day. Some studies have suggested that most COVID-19 infections (over 80%) show mild or
no symptoms, about 14% show severe symptoms (but without requiring ICU admission), and 6% show critically-
severe symptoms requiring ICU admission [16, 49, 50]. Consequently, we set f2 = 0.2 and assume that half of the
80% of cases that show no or mild symptoms are asymptomatic (hence, we set f1 = 0.4 and 1− (f1 + f2) = 0.4).
The modification parameter for the relative infectiousness of asymptomatic people (ηa) was estimated from [34, 51]
to be 0.5. Further, Li et al. [51] estimated this parameter to be between 0.42 and 0.55. Hence, we set ηa = ηh = 0.5.
Since about 15% of COVID-19 patients die [34], we estimated δu = δh = 0.015 per day. To obtain estimates for
δa and δicu, we assume that δa = 0.5δu (so that δa = 0.0075 per day) and δicu = 1.5δu (so that, δicu = 0.0225 per
day) [52]. The parameter for the efficacy of quarantine to prevent acquisition of infection during quarantine (θj) is
estimated to be θj = 0.5.
We estimated the efficacy of face-masks (ǫM ) based on the results of a number of clinical trials. For instance,
data from Driessche et al. [53] shows that surgical masks reduced P. aeruginosa infected aerosols produced by
coughing by over 80% in cystic fibrosis patients. A similar study by Stockwell et al. [54] shows that surgical
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masks reduced colony-forming unit (CFU) count by over 90% (these two studies in [53, 54] show that the N95
masks (respirators) were more effective). Similarly, van der Sande et al. [55] show that home-made tea-cloth
masks had an inward efficiency between 58% and 77% over a 3-hour duration of wear, while inward efficiency
ranged 7285% and 9899% for surgical and N95-equivalent masks. Consequently, following Eikenberry et al. [52],
we estimate inward mask efficacy to range widely between 2080% for cloth masks, and at least 50% for well-made,
tightly fitting masks made of optimal materials, and 7090% for surgical masks, and over 95% typical for p in the
range of properly worn N95 masks. Based on this, we set ǫM = 0.5. We set the proportion of quarantined exposed
individuals who are hospitalized (r) to be r = 0.7. There is no good data for the efficacy of isolation/hospitalization
to prevent disease transmission by symptomatic individuals in isolation/hospital. Nonetheless, it seems plausible to
assume that, at the later stage of the pandemic (such as at the present moment), the public health system capacity
has been greatly improved to the extent that such transmission do not occur. Hence, we set θq = 1. The parameter
(νh) for the rate of ICU admission is estimated to be νh = 0.083 per day (based on data from [56] it is in the
range of 6% − 12%). The remaining parameters of the model (2.1), β, cM , σa and αu, were estimated from the
mortality data for the state of New York and the entire US [4–7] (based on the fitting of the state of New York data
in Figure 2 (a) and data for the entire US in Figure 2 (b)). The estimating process involved minimizing the sum of
the squares of the difference between the predictions of model (2.1) (cumulative deaths) and the observed COVID-
19 cumulative deaths data from New York state (for the period from March 1, 2020 to April 7, 2020). In particular,
the fitted values obtained using the state of New York mortality data were β = 0.8648 per day, p = 0.8073 per day,
cM = 0.0546, σa = 0.2435 per day and αu = 0.1168 per day, while the fitted values obtained using mortality data
for the entire US were β = 1.0966 per day, p = 0.7163, cM = 0.1598, σa = 0.3090 per day and αu = 0.1065 per
day.
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Figure 2: Time series plot showing a least squares fit of system (2.1) to New York state (a), and entire US (b),
COVID-19 related death data [4–7]. The red dots represent data points, while the solid blue line represent predic-
tions of death from system (2.1).
3 Results
3.1 Analytical Results: Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Disease-free Equilibrium
The model (2.1) has a line of disease-free equilibria (DFE), given by
(S∗u, S
∗
q , E
∗
u, E
∗
q , I
∗
u, I
∗
h, I
∗
a , I
∗
icu, R
∗) = (Su(0), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
where Su(0) is the initial size of the non-quarantined susceptible individuals. The asymptotic stability of the DFE
will be analysed using the next generation operator method [57, 58]. Using the notation in [57], it follows that
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the next generation operator matrices, F and V for the new infection terms and the transition terms, are given,
respectively, by
F =


0 0 βm(1− ǫMcM )(1− q)p βm(1− ǫMcM )(1− q)pηh βm(1− ǫMcM )(1 − q)pηa 0
0 0 βm(1− ǫMcM )qp βm(1− ǫMcM )qpηh βm(1− ǫMcM )qpηa 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0


,
and,
V =


K1 0 0 0 0 0
−αu σq 0 0 0 0
−f1σu 0 K2 0 0 0
−f2σu −rσq −φu K3 −σa 0
−(1− f1 − f2) −(1− r)σq 0 0 K4 0
0 0 0 −νh 0 K5


,
where, K1 = σu + αu,K2 = γu + φu + δu,K3 = γh + νh + δh,K4 = γa + σa + δa,K5 = δicu + γicu. It is
convenient to defineRc by (where ρ now represents the spectral radius of the next generation matrix FV
−1):
Rc = ρ(FV
−1) = Rcu + Rca + Rch, (3.1)
where,
Rcu =
βm(1− ǫMcM )pBu
K1K2K3K4
, Rca =
βm(1− ǫMcM )pηaBa
K1K2K3K4
, Rch =
βm(1− ǫMcM )pηhBh
K1K2K3K4
,
with,
Bu = K3K4(1− q)σuf1,
Ba = K2K3{(1 − r)[(1− q)αu +K1q] + (1− f1 − f2)(1− q)σu},
Bh = [(1− q)αu + qK1][(1 − r)K2σa + rK2K4] + (1− q)σu[(1− f1 − f2)K2σa +K4(f1φu + f2K2)].
The result below follows from Theorem 2 of [57].
Theorem 3.1. The disease-free equilibrium (DFE) of the model (2.1) is locally-asymptotically stable if Rc < 1,
and unstable if Rc > 1.
The quantity Rc is the control reproduction number of the model 2.1. It measures the average number of new
COVID-19 infections generated by an average infected individual introduced into a population where basic pub-
lic health interventions (quarantine, isolation, social-distancing, testing etc.) are implemented. The quantity Rc
is the sum of the constituent reproduction numbers associated with the number of new COVID-19 cases gener-
ated by symptomatically-infectious humans (Rcu), hospitalized/isolated individuals (Rch) and asymptomatically-
infectious humans (Rca). The epidemiological implication of Theorem 3.1 is that a small influx of COVID-19
cases will not generate a COVID-19 outbreak if the control reproduction number (Rc) is less than unity. It is
worth mentioning that for Kermack-McKendrick-type mathematical models with no vital/demographic dynamics
(i.e., births or natural death processes) or waning immunity (to continuously feed the susceptible class), such as the
model (2.1), it is instructive to compute the final size of the epidemic [40, 59–62]. The final epidemic size relations,
which are natural quantities associated with the dynamics of epidemic models (with no vital/demographic dynam-
ics), allow for the realistic quantification of disease burden and can be used to assess the impact and effectiveness
of various intervention and mitigation strategies [40]. The final size relations for the epidemic model (2.1) are
calculated in Section 3.2 below.
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3.2 Computation of Final Size of the Pandemic
In this section, the final size of the COVID-19 pandemic will be calculated. Using the notation in [59], let x ∈ IR6+,
y ∈ IR2+, and z ∈ IR+ represent the sets of infected, susceptible and recovered components of the model. Thus,it
follows from the model (2.1), that x(t) = (Eu(t), Eq(t), Iu(t), Ih(t), Ia(t), Iicu(t))
T , y(t) = (Su(t), Sq(t))
T
and z(t) = R(t). Further, following Arino et al. [59], let D be the m × m diagonal matrix whose diagonal
entries, denoted by σi(i = 1, 2, · · · ,m), are the relative susceptibilities of the corresponding susceptible class. It
is convenient to define Π to be an n × n matrix with the property that the (i, j) entry represents the fraction of
the jth susceptible compartment that goes into the ith infected compartment upon becoming infected. Let b be an
n−dimensional row vector of relative horizontal transmissions. Using the notation in [59], let the infection rate,
λ, of the model (2.1) be represented by β. That is, λ = β(x, y, z). It is convenient to define the m−dimensional
vector Γ = [Γ1,Γ2, · · · ,Γm] = βbV
−1ΠD [59]. It follows, in the context of the model (2.1), that
b = [0, 0, 1, ηh, ηa, 0], Γ =
[
Rc,
βm(1− ǫMcM )[(1 − r)(K3ηa + ηhσa) + ηhrK4]θj
K3K4
]
, D =
[
1 0
0 θj
]
and,
Π =


1− q 0
q 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0


.
Using the above change and variables and definitions, the model (2.1) reduces to:
x˙ = ΠDyβ(x, y, z)bx − V x,
y˙ = −Dyβ(x, y, z)bx,
z˙ = Wx,
(3.2)
where W is a k × n matrix with the property that the (i, j) entry represents the rate at which individuals of the
jth infected compartment transition into the recovered (ith z) compartment upon recovery and the matrix V is as
defined in Section 3.1. It is worth stating that the reproduction number (Rc, of the model (2.1) (or, equivalently,
(3.2)), can be recovered using the definition Rc = β(0, y0, z0)bV
−1ΠDy0 given in Theorem 2.1 of [59] (it should
be noted that this theorem also allows for recovering the local asymptotic stability result for the family of disease-
free equilibria of the model (2.1), given in Section 3.1). Furthermore, the results below, for the final size relations
of the model (2.1) (or, equivalently, (3.2)), can be established using Theorem 5.1 of [59].
Theorem 3.2. Consider the epidemic model (2.1) (or, equivalently, (3.2)). The final size relations are given by
ln
(
Su(0)
Su(∞)
)
≥ Rc
[Su(0)− Su(∞)]
Su(0)
+
θjpβm(1− ǫMcM ) [(1− r)(K3ηa + ηhσa) + ηhrK4] [Su(0)− Sq(∞)]
Su(0)K3K4
+
pβm(1− ǫMcM )
Su(0)K1K2K3K4
[C1Eu(0) + C2Eq(0) + C3Iu(0) + C4Ih(0) + C5Ia(0)] ,
Sq(∞) ≥ Sq(0)
(
Su(∞)
Su(0)
)θj
, (3.3)
where,
C1 =
{{
(rαu + f2σu)K4 + σa [(1− r)αu + (1− f1 − f2)]
}
ηh + ηaK3 [(1− r)αu + (1− f1 − f2)]
}
K2
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+σuK4f1 (ηhφu +K3) ,
C2 = K1K2 [ηa(1− r)K3 + (1− r)ηhσa + rηhK4] ,
C3 = K1K4(ηhφu +K3),
C4 = K1K2K4ηh,
C5 = K1K2(ηaK3 + ηhσa),
with the parameter groupings Ki(i = 1, 2, 3, 4) as defined in Section 3.1. It is worth mentioning that, by setting
Eu(0) = Eq(0) = Iu(0) = Ia(0) = Iicu(0) = Sq(0) = 0, with Su(0) > 0 and Ih(0) > 0, the final size relations,
given by the inequalities in (3.3), reduce to:
ln
(
Su(0)
Su(∞)
)
≥ Rc
[Su(0)− Su(∞)]
Su(0)
+
θjβm(1− ǫMcM ) [(1− r)(K3ηa + ηhσa) + ηhrK4] [Su(0) − Sq(∞)]
Su(0)K3K4
+
ηhpβm(1− ǫMcM )
Su(0)K3
Ih(0).
4 Numerical simulations
We simulated the model (2.1) using the baseline parameter values tabulated in Table 3 (unless otherwise stated), to
assess the population-level impact of the various control and mitigation strategies against the spread of COVID-19
in the US state of New York discussed in Section 2.1. We also simulated the model using the calibrated parameters
in Table 4, together with the other estimated parameters in Table 3, to assess the population-level impact of various
control measures in the entire US. It should be mentioned that in all the simulations carried out, the various non-
pharmaceutical interventions are maintained at their baseline values (unless otherwise stated).
We simulated the model to, first of all, assess the impact of social-distancing (which, in our study, extends
beyond individuals staying 2 meters (or 6 feet) apart to include school and non-essential business closures, staying
at home, avoiding large gatherings, etc). Further, in our study, we measured the effect of social-distancing by
the overall reduction in the baseline value of the community contact rate parameter (β). The simulation results
obtained, depicted in Figure 3, show a projected 66, 300 patients in hospital (or in self-isolation) at the pandemic
peak, expected to be attained on May 5, 2020 (Figure 3 (a)) and 105, 100 cumulative number of deaths (Figure 3 (c))
for the state of New York under the baseline scenario (i.e., for the baseline level of social-distancing). Similarly,
the projections for the entire US, under the baseline nation-wide social-distancing scenario, are 115, 000 daily
hospitalizations at the pandemic peak (Figure 3 (b)) and 164, 000 cumulative number of deaths (Figure 3 (d)). It is
noteworthy that our projection for the cumulative mortality for the entire US (of 164, 000) falls markedly below the
2.2 million mortality projected by Ferguson et al. [34]. Our US-wide mortality projection, however, falls within
the range of (38, 243, 162, 106) estimated by Murray et al. [65]. When social-distancing is improved above the
baseline effectiveness levels (i.e., increase in efficacy and adherence/coverage of social-distancing), Figure 3 shows
a dramatic reduction of COVID-19 burden for both New York state and the entire US. In particular, for a social-
distancing regimen that reduces the contact rate parameter β by 10% from its baseline value, the expected number of
daily hospitalizations/isolation of confirmed cases at the peak of the pandemic decreases to 50, 380 (corresponding
to a 24% decrease in hospitalizations/isolation from baseline) for the state of New York. Similarly, nation-wide
hospitalizations/isolation of confirmed cases at the peak of the pandemic decreases by 21% to 89, 930. Furthermore,
for a highly-effective social-distancing strategy (such as a social-distancing strategy that results in at least 40%
reduction in the baseline value of β), the peak hospitalizations/isolation of confirmed cases for New York state and
the entire US dramatically reduce to 5, 000 and 14, 000, respectively (this represents a 92% and 88% reduction
in peak hospitalizations for the state of New York and nationwide, respectively). Similarly, for this scenario, the
cumulative mortality for New York state and the entire US reduce, respectively, to 20, 700 and 59, 600. Thus,
implementing a highly-effective social-distancing strategy (which can reduce the baseline community contact rate,
β, by at least 40%) will avert over 80% and 64% of the predicted baseline deaths in New York state and nationwide,
respectively. The effectiveness levels and coverage of social-distancing in New York state and the entire US has
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Table 3: Estimated and fitted parameters of the model (2.1) using COVID-19 mortality data for the state of New
York [4–7]. With this set of parameter values, the control reproduction number (Rc) is given by Rc = 1.95.
Parameters Value Source
β 0.8648 Fitted (calibrated using New York state COVID-19 data [4–7])
cM 0.0546 Fitted (calibrated using New York state COVID-19 data [4–7])
ǫM 0.5 Estimated from [63]
p 0.8073 Fitted (calibrated using New York state COVID-19 data [4–7])
q 0.2 Assumed
ψq 1/14 Estimated [6, 16]
ηa 0.5 Estimated from [34, 51]
ηh 0.5 Estimated from [34, 51]
θj 0.5 Assumed
σu 1/5.1 [3, 13–15]
σa 0.2435 Fitted (calibrated using New York state COVID-19 data [4–7])
σq 1/5.1 [3, 13–15]
f1 0.4 Estimated from [16, 49, 50]
f2 0.2 [16, 49, 50]
1− (f1 + f2) 0.4 Estimated from [16, 49, 50]
αu 0.1160 Fitted (calibrated using New York state COVID-19 data [4–7].)
γu 1/10 [34, 48]
γh 1/8 [34]
γa 0.13978 [64]
γicu 1/10 [34]
δh 0.015 [34]
δu 0.015 [34]
δa 0.0075 Estimated from [34]
δicu 0.0225 Estimated from [34]
φu 1/5 [34]
r 0.7 Assumed
νh 0.083 Estimated from [56]
θq 1 Assumed
Table 4: Estimated and fitted parameters of the model (2.1) using COVID-19 mortality data for the entire US [4–7].
Using this set of parameter values, the control reproduction number (Rc) is given by Rc = 2.07.
Parameters Value Source
β 1.0966 Fitted (calibrated using US COVID-19 data [4–7])
cM 0.1598 Fitted (calibrated using US COVID-19 data [4–7])
p 0.7163 Fitted (calibrated using US COVID-19 data [4–7])
σa 0.3090 Fitted (calibrated using US COVID-19 data [4–7])
αu 0.1065 Fitted (calibrated using US COVID-19 data [4–7])
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greatly improved, by April 2, 2020 [66–69], to the extent that it is plausible to assume that 40% reduction in the
baseline value of β has already been achieved in both the state of New York and nationwide. Therefore, this study
shows that the state of New York and the entire US could have recorded catastrophic COVID-19-induced mortality
(between 100, 000 to 200, 000) if not for the high effectiveness levels and coverage of the strict social-distancing
measures implemented in the state and nationwide. Our study suggests that if the current level of social-distancing
effectiveness and coverage is maintained through May or June 2020, in the state of New York and nationwide,
COVID-19 can be eliminated from both the state and the entire nation. Extending the simulations for Figure 3
shows that the current level of the social-distancing regimen in the state of New York should be extended until
late September 2021 to guarantee the elimination of COVID-19 (in the context of Figure 3, COVID-19 elimination
is measured in terms of when the cumulative mortality stabilizes). Similarly, for the entire US, social-distancing
needs to be maintained until March 2021.
Additional simulations were carried out to assess the population-level impact of the duration and timing of when
to terminate the current strict social-distancing protocols. For the best-case scenario, where the current strict social-
distancing protocols were assumed to be implemented right from the very beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in
New York state (March 1, 2020) and the entire US (January 20, 2020) and maintained until early December, 2020,
the results obtained for the cumulative mortality recorded for New York state and the entire US are 25, 000 and
60, 000, respectively. This represents 76% and 63% reductions, respectively, in the cumulative mortality for New
York state and the entire US, in comparison to the baseline scenario (i.e., worst-case scenario where the social-
distancing and other community contacts-reduction strategies have not been implemented at the stringent levels)
(blue curves in Figures 4 (a)-(f)). Furthermore, if the social-distancing regimens were implemented on the days
they were officially implemented in New York state (March 22, 2020) and the entire US (March 16, 2020), but
maintained until early December, 2020, the cumulative mortality to be recorded will be 55, 000 and 75, 500. This
represents 48% and 53% reductions, respectively, in the cumulative mortality from the baseline (magenta curves in
Figures 4 (a)-(f)).
The effect of the timing of when to terminate the current strict social-distancing protocols was also monitored.
Our simulations show that terminating the current strict social-distancing by the end of April 2020 (i.e., the 40%
reduction in the baseline value of β is now lost due to the termination of the social-distancing measures), a sig-
nificant rebound of COVID-19 burden will be recorded in as early as July 2020. In particular, New York state
will record 144, 000 deaths representing a 37% increase from the baseline scenario (Figure 4 (a)), while the entire
US will record up to 156, 000 deaths. This represents a mere 5% reduction of cumulative mortality, in relation to
the baseline scenario (Figure 4 (d)). In other words, the early termination of the current strict social-distancing
measures (by the end of April 2020) will result in catastrophic COVID-19 burden, similar to the dire projections
made for the pre-social-distancing period (i.e., all the gains of the social-distancing and other control and mitigation
measures will essentially be lost). However, if the strict-distancing measures were to be terminated by the end of
May, 2020, the cumulative mortality figures are projected to be 91, 800 for New York state and 118, 300 for the
entire US. This represents a 13% and 28% reduction, respectively, in the baseline cumulative mortality (Figures 4
(b) and (e)). Finally, if the social-distancing measures are terminated at the end of June, 2020, the projection for the
cumulative mortality figures are 33, 200 for New York state and 50, 300 for the entire US. This represents 68% and
69% reductions, respectively, in the baseline cumulative mortality (Figures 4 (c) and (f)). These projected mortality
numbers, for the early termination of social-distancing, fall within the range given by Murphy et al. [65]. Our study
clearly shows that the clamor to relax or terminate the social-distancing measures (that have proven to be hugely
successful in both the state of New York and the entire US), as part of the move to re-open the state and the country,
would undoubtedly trigger a devastating rebound of COVID-19 in both New York state and the entire US. Data has
already shown that certain countries that have relaxed the successfully-implemented social-distancing measures,
such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea, are now witnessing a rebound of COVID-19 [70]. In particular,
Hong Kong announced 84 newly-confirmed cases on March 28 (followed by over 70 new daily cases in the next
three days). Further, Taiwan reported more than 20 newly-confirmed cases per day in mid-March (up from barely
5 cases per day late in January). South Korea reported 83 newly-confirmed cases on April 3, 2020 [70].
It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned simulations for the effect of social-distancing were carried out
for the case where other interventions (contact-tracing, quarantine, face-mask, usage etc.) are also implemented (at
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their baseline values in Tables 3 and 4). If face-masks are not used, then the above cumulative numbers will be even
more catastrophic. For instance, if the strict social-distancing protocol is terminated in New York state by April 30,
2020, and no face-mask-based intervention is implemented, about 150, 800 deaths will be recorded by July 2020.
Furthermore, terminating the social-distancing protocols by end of May 2020 or end of June 2020 will result in
projected 108, 500 and 44, 300 deaths, respectively, in the state. The corresponding numbers for the entire US (for
the case where mask-based intervention is not implemented) are projected to be 167, 000, 148, 000, and 91, 900,
respectively. Thus, this study strongly suggest that utmost caution should be exercised before terminating the
current strict social-distancing protocols being implemented in the state of New York and nationwide. At the very
least, a careful state-by-state (or county-by-county) phase withdrawal (based on the updated COVID-19 incidence,
mass testing data, and proximity to COVID-19 hot spots) should be carried out.
The effect of quarantine of individuals suspected of being exposed to COVID-19 is monitored by simulating
the model (2.1) using the baseline parameter values and various levels of effectiveness of quarantine to prevent the
acquisition of infection during quarantine (θj). The results obtained, depicted in Figure 5, show that quarantine of
susceptible individuals has only marginal impact in reducing COVID-related hospitalizations for both New York
state (Figure 5 (a)) and the entire US (Figure 5 (b)). In particular, at the baseline quarantine efficacy (θj = 0.5),
the state of New York will record 66, 000 daily hospitalizations. The implementation of a perfect quarantine in the
state (i.e., θj = 0) reduces the number of hospitalizations marginally to 60, 000. The numbers for the entire US
for the baseline and perfect quarantine are 115, 000 and 97, 000, respectively. The marginal effect of quarantine in
minimizing COVID-related hospitalizations is even more pronounced when the isolation strategy is perfect (Figures
5 (c) and (d)). That is, for the epidemiological scenario where the isolation (or hospitalization) of confirmed cases
is perfect (that is, individuals in isolation at home or in hospital are not part of the actively-mixing population, so
that θq = 1), the community-wide implementation of mass quarantine of individuals suspected of being exposed to
COVID-19 will have very marginal impact on COVID-19 burden (measured in terms of reductions in COVID-19
hospitalizations). This result is consistent with that reported in [71]. Thus, this study suggests that, since self-
isolation and isolation in hospitals have been implemented at high effectiveness levels in both the state of New
York and in the entire US, the mass quarantine of suspected cases may not be a cost-effective public health strategy
for combating the spread of COVID-19 in both New York state and the entire US. Figures 5 (c) and (d) illustrate
the dynamics of the model (2.1) for various effectiveness levels of quarantine and isolation, for both New York
state and the US, further emphasizing the marginal nature of quarantine (even for the cases where isolation was not
implemented at a perfect level) in minimizing COVID-19 hospitalizations.
The effect of contact-tracing (measured in terms of the detection of asymptomatic cases, following testing/
diagnosis of a confirmed COVID-19 case they may have had close contacts with or random testing) on the trans-
mission dynamics and control of the COVID-19 pandemic is also monitored by simulating the model (2.1) using
the baseline parameter values in Table 3 and various values of the contact-tracing parameters (αu and σa). In partic-
ular, the simulations are run by increasing the values of αu and σa, simultaneously (and by the same amount) from
their respective baseline values. Figure 6 depicts the solution profiles obtained, showing the worst case scenario of
49, 400 cases in the state of New York and 64, 600 cases nationwide on the day the pandemic peaks (on April 26,
2020) if no contact tracing is implemented. If implemented at its baseline rate, contact tracing reduces the size of
the pandemic peak number of new COVID-19 cases by 27% for the state of New York, and by 22% nationwide,
while a 75% improvement in contact-tracing will reduce the predicted number of confirmed cases to approximately
31, 300 for the state of New York and 41, 200 nationwide. This represents 13% and 10% reduction from baseline
and shows that while contact-tracing implemented even only at baseline is important in reducing the size of the
pandemic peak number of new COVID-19 cases, investing much resources towards contact-tracing beyond the
baseline rate might not be cost-effective.
Simulations were further carried out to assess the population-level impact of the widespread use of masks in
public, by running the model (2.1) with various values of mask efficacy (ǫM ) and coverage (cM ). The results
obtained, depicted in Figure 7, show a marked decrease in the number of hospitalizations, for both New York
state (Figures 7 (a), (b) and (c)) and the entire US (Figures 7 (d), (e) and (f)), with increasing values of the mask
efficacy and coverage. Further, using an efficacious mask, such as a mask of efficacy 50%, can greatly flatten the
pandemic curve, in addition to significantly reducing the burden of the pandemic (measured, in this case, in terms
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of hospitalizations). However, such a mask will fail to lead to the elimination of the disease (Figure 7 (b)). It
is worth emphasizing that, although the use of masks with low efficacy may not lead to disease elimination, they
still are highly useful by causing a significant decrease in the burden of the pandemic (i.e., significantly reduce
hospitalizations) if a significant proportion of the populace wear them. For instance, if 75% of the populace in New
York or the entire US wear masks with efficacy as low as 25% (i.e., cloths masks), the number of hospitalizations
will be reduced by 63% and 64%, respectively (compared to the scenario were masks were not used) (Figures 7
(a) and (d)). A contour plot of the reproduction number of the model (Rc), as a function of masks efficacy (ǫM )
and compliance (cM ) is depicted in Figure 8. If masks of higher efficacy, such as surgical masks (with estimated
efficacy ≥ 70%) are used in the state of New York, disease elimination is, indeed, feasible if at least 70% of the
populace wear the masks (Figures 8 (a) and (b)). Similar results were obtained for the entire US (Figures 8 (c) and
(d)).
Additional simulations were carried out to assess the combined impact of public face-masks use strategy and
strict social-distancing strategy (which reduces the baseline value of the community transmission parameter, β, by
40%) on the control of COVID-19 in New York state and the entire US. The results obtained, depicted in Figure
9, show that, combining the strict social-distancing strategy with a strategy based on using moderately-effective
face-masks (with efficacy ǫM ≥ 0.5) in public, will lead to the elimination of the disease in New York state if only
30% of the population use face-masks in public (Figure 9 (a)). This clearly shows that disease elimination in New
York state is more feasible if the face-masks-based strategy is combined with the strict social-distancing strategy.
Similar results were obtained for the entire US (Figure 9 (b)), where, in this case, only 10% compliance in mask
usage in public will be needed for COVID-19 elimination.
In summary, the above simulations show that the use of face-masks (even those with low efficacy, but with high
coverage) in public offers significant community-wide impact in reducing and mitigating the burden of COVID-19
in both New York state and the entire US. In other words, the use of low efficacy face masks with high coverage
is always useful. Further, combining the face-masks use strategy with a strategy based on the implementation of
strict social-distancing is more effective in curtailing (and eliminating) COVID-19, in comparison to the singular
implementation of either strategy.
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Figure 3: Effect of social-distancing (β). Simulations of the model (2.1), showing daily hospitalizations (and
self-isolation) and cumulative mortality, as a function of time, for various values of social-distancing effectiveness
(measured in terms of efficacy and adherence/coverage levels). (a) Daily hospitalizations for the state of New
York (b) Daily hospitalizations in the entire US (c) Cumulative mortality for the state of New York (d) Cumulative
mortality for the entire US. Parameter values used are as given in Tables 3 and 4, with various values of β.
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Figure 4: Effect of duration and timing of the termination of the strict social-distancing (β) measures currently
in place in New York state and the entire US. Simulations of the model (2.1), showing the effect of the duration
and timing of the termination of the strict social-distancing measures against COVID-19. (a) Cumulative mortality
for the state of New York if the current strict social-distancing regimen is terminated by the end of April 2020.
(b) Cumulative mortality for the state of New York if the current strict social-distancing regimen is terminated by
the end of May 2020. (c) Cumulative mortality for the state of New York if the current strict social-distancing
regimen is terminated by the end of June 2020. (d) Cumulative mortality for the entire US if the current strict
social-distancing regimen is terminated by the end of April 2020. (e) Cumulative mortality for the entire US if
current strict social-distancing regimen is terminated by the end of May 2020. (f) Cumulative mortality for the
entire US if current strict social-distancing regimen is terminated by the end of June 2020. Blue curves represent
the effect of implementing the current strict social-distancing measures from the very beginning of the COVID-19
pandemic, in New York state (March 1, 2020) and the entire US (January 20, 2020), and maintained until early
December, 2020. Magenta curves represent the effect of implementing the current strict social-distancing measures
on the actual days they were implemented in New York state (March 22, 2020) and the entire US (March 16, 2020)
and maintained until early December, 2020. Red curves represent the effect of terminating the current strict social-
distancing regimen by the end of April, 2020 (Plots (a) and (d)), end of May, 2020 (Plots (b) and (e)) and end of
June, 2020 (Plots (c) and (f)). With the exception of blue curves, solid dotted vertical lines indicate the start of the
current strict social-distancing regimen (March 16, nationwide, and March 22, 2020 for the state of New York),
dashed vertical lines indicate when the current strict social-distancing is terminated, and the green horizontal line
segments indicate the duration of the strict social-distancing regimen. Parameter values used are as given in Tables
3 and 4, with various values of β.
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Figure 5: Effect of quarantine of individuals suspected of being exposed to COVID-19. Simulations of the model
(2.1), showing daily hospitalizations, as a function of time, for various values of the efficacy of quarantine (θj)
to prevent infection during quarantine and efficacy of isolation or hospitalization to prevent isolated/hospitalized
patients from mixing with the rest of the population (θq). (a) Effect of quarantine efficacy (θj) on daily hospital-
izations for the state of New York (b) Effect of quarantine efficacy (θj) on daily hospitalizations for the the entire
US. (c) Effect of quarantine (θj) and isolation (θq) on daily hospitalizations for the state of New York. (d) Effect of
quarantine (θj) and isolation (θq) on daily hospitalizations for the entire US. Parameter values used are as given in
Tables 3 and 4, with various values of θj and θq.
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Figure 6: Effect of contact-tracing (αu and σa). Simulations of the model (2.1), showing the number of new
COVID-19 cases for various levels of contact-tracing effectiveness (measured based on increases in the values of
the contact-tracing parameters, αu and σa from their baseline values, as a function of time. (a) Number of new
cases for the state of New York (b) Number of new cases for the entire US. Parameter values used are as given in
Tables 3 and 4, with various values of αu and σa.
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Figure 7: Effect of face-masks use in public. Simulations of the model (2.1), showing daily hospitalizations, as a
function of time, for various efficacies of of face-masks (ǫM ) and coverage (cM ). (a) 25% mask efficacy for the
state of New York. (b) 50% mask efficacy for the state of New York. (c) 75% mask efficacy for the state of New
York. (d) 25% mask efficacy for the entire US. (d) 50% mask efficacy for the entire US. (c) 75% mask efficacy for
the entire US. Parameter values used are as given in Tables 3 and 4, with various values of ǫM and cM .
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Figure 8: Effect of face-masks use in public. (a) Contour plot of the control reproduction number (Rc), as a
function of face-mask efficacy (ǫM ) and mask coverage (cM ), for the state of New York. (b) Profile of the control
reproduction number (Rc), as a function of face-mask coverage (cM ) for the state of New York. (c) Contour plot of
of the control reproduction number (Rc), as a function of face-mask efficacy (ǫM ) and mask coverage (cM ), for the
entire US. (d) Profile of the control reproduction number (Rc), as a function of mask coverage (cM ) for the entire
US.
Parameter values used are as given in Tables 3 and 4, with various values of ǫM and cM .
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Figure 9: Effect of combined use of face-masks in public and strict social-distancing. Profile of the control repro-
duction number
(Rc), as a function of mask coverage (cM ) for different percentage reductions in the baseline value of the effective
contact rate (β) for (a) the state of New York. (b) the entire US. Parameter values used are as given in Tables 3 and
4, with various values of ǫM and cM .
5 Discussion and Conclusions
The world is currently experiencing a devastating pandemic of a novel Coronavirus (caused by SARS-CoV2) that
emerged in Wuhan city of China in December of 2019. The deadly COVID-19 pandemic has spread to over 210
countries, causing over 1.9 million cases and 125,000 deaths worldwide (with some parts of Asia, Europe and, now,
the US suffering the brunt of the burden). There is currently no safe and effective vaccine for use in humans against
COVID-19. There is also no safe and effective antiviral. Consequently, control and mitigation efforts against
COVID-19 are limited to non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as social-distancing (which involves keeping a
physical distance of at least 6 feet from other humans in public, lockdowns of communities, closure of schools,
malls, places of worships and other gathering places), quarantine of suspected cases, contact-tracing, isolation (at
home or in hospital) of confirmed cases and the use of face masks (both low quality cloth masks and the higher
quality surgical masks) in public. This study is based on the design, analysis and simulations of a new mathematical
model for providing deeper insights into the transmission dynamics and control of COVID-19 in a community.
Specifically, the model designed in this study was parametrized using COVID-19 data from the US state of New
York and the entire US population. The model was used to assess the population-impact of the aforementioned
control and mitigation interventions.
We parameterized the model using COVID-19 data from New York state and the entire US, and extensive
numerical simulations were carried out using the parametrized model to assess the population-level impact of the
various intervention strategies. With the baseline levels of the four main intervention strategies considered (social-
distancing, quarantine/isolation, contact-tracing and the use of face-masks), the state of New York is projected to
see a peak of the pandemic around mid April, 2020 (with 66, 300 number of hospitalizations/isolation of confirmed
cases and 105, 100 deaths at the peak), while the entire US will see its peak around end of April, 2020 (with
115, 000 hospitalizations/isolation of confirmed cases and 164, 000 deaths at the peak). Our projections for baseline
(worst-case) mortality for the US are much lower than the 2.2 million deaths suggested by Ferguson et al. in the
absence of interventions [34], but fall within the range estimated in [65]. Our projected numbers for COVID-19
burden (morbidity and mortality) dramatically decreases if strict social-distancing measures are implemented at
high adherence levels. For instance, it was shown that strict compliance to the statewide lock-down in New York
state (which corresponds to reducing the baseline contact rate in our model by at least 40%) will reduce the peak
values for hospitalizations/isolation of confirmed cases and mortality by 92% and 80%, respectively. Similarly,
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the peak values for cases and mortality in the entire US (if a nation-wide lockdown capable of reducing baseline
contact rate by at least 40%) will decrease by 88% and 64%, respectively.
The duration and timing of the termination of strict social-distancing measures are critically-important in the
battle to effectively combat pandemics of respiratory diseases, such as the devastating COVID-19 pandemic. While
the rapid implementation of strict social-distancing measures (during the early stage of the pandemic), maintained
over a relatively long period of time (e.g., until the summer), will undoubtedly effectively combat the burden of
the pandemic. Early termination of these measures will cause catastrophic outcomes. For instance, our study
shows that relaxing or terminating the strict social-distancing measures in the state of New York and the US as a
whole by end of April 2020 will trigger a devastating second wave, generating COVID-19 burden similar to those
obtained during the pre-strict-social-distancing time in the state and in the entire nation by the end of July 2020
(with cumulative mortality numbers in the range reported in [65] for both New York state and the entire US). In
particular, up to 144, 000 and 156, 000 cumulative deaths will have been recorded in the state of New York and the
entire US if the social-distancing measures are shut down by the end of April, 2020. Extending the termination of
social-distancing, such as to end of June 2020, significantly reduces the likelihood of a second wave (in addition
to significantly reducing the associated burden of the pandemic). Consequently, a great deal of caution must be
exercised before decisions are made to relax or terminate the existing highly-successful social-distancing protocols
in both the state of New York and the entire US. It is noteworthy that countries that have recently relaxed these
measures, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea, have already started seeing a rebound of COVID-19.
Our study suggests that the decision to relax or terminate the social-distancing measures should by on a case-by-
case (i.e., state-by-state or county-by-county) basis, and should be informed by updated COVID-19 incidence and
mortality data, number of COVID-19 tests (both antibody and surveillance tests) and proximity of a locality to
COVID-19 hot spots. In particular, our study shows that strict social-distancing should be maintained until the
year 2021 (up to late September 2021 for New York state, and early March, 2021 for the entire US) to eliminate
COVID-19.
Quarantine of people suspected of being exposed to a respiratory disease is perhaps the oldest public health
control measure in human history. Our study shows that widescale implementation of quarantine intervention
may not be very effective (in minimizing the burden of COVID-19) if the strategy of isolating confirmed cases is
effective. In other words, our study suggests that if isolation can be implemented effectively (high efficacy and
coverage), then quarantine of people suspected of contracting COVID-19 may not be necessary. This result is
consistent with what was reported by Day et al. [71]. Tracing the contacts of confirmed cases (known as contact-
tracing) was also shown to only be marginally-effective in minimizing the burden of the pandemic. In particular,
even if contact-tracing is implemented at the highest possible level (represented in our study based on increases in
the contact-tracing parameters by 75%), the decrease in the burden of the pandemic recorded was only marginal
(13% and 10% for cases in New York state and nationwide, respectively, and 5% and 3% for mortality for New
York state and nationwide, respectively).
The use of face-masks in public in times of outbreaks of respiratory diseases has a rich history. Although quite
popular in some parts of the world (notably Asia), the use of face-masks in public is somewhat controversial. This
was more evident in the US during the COVID-19, leading, ultimately, to the recommendation to use face-masks
(home-made cloths masks) in public by the The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on April
2, 2020. Our study shows that the use of high efficacy masks (such as surgical masks, with estimated efficacy
of at least 70%) will lead to a dramatic reduction of COVID-19 burden if its coverage is high enough (at least
70%). In fact, our study shows that even face-masks of low efficacy (home-made cloths masks) will lead to a
dramatic reduction of disease burden (albeit this will not lead to the elimination of the disease). For example, even
face-mask efficacy of 25% can lead to a 63% and 64% reduction in the number of hospitalizations/isolation of
confirmed cases at the pandemic peak in New York state and nationwide if 75% of the population wear face-masks
in public. These results are consistent with those reported by Eikenberry et al. [52]. Furthermore, by generating
contour plots for the control reproduction number of the model (2.1) (Rc), as a function of mask efficiency (ǫM ) and
coverage (cM ), our study shows that the use of high efficacy masks (such as surgical masks, with estimated efficacy
of ≥ 75%) will, indeed, lead to the elimination of COVID-19 (in both the state of New York and in the entire
US nation) if the coverage is high enough (about 80%). This study shows that the use of face-masks in public is
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always useful, and their population-level impact increases will increases efficacy and coverage. In particular, even
the use of low efficacy masks will greatly reduce the burden of the pandemic if the coverage in their usage in the
community is high enough. Furthermore, our study shows that combining the masks-based strategy with the strict
social-distancing strategy is more effective than the singular implementation of either strategy. For instance, our
study shows that COVID-19 can be eliminated from the state of New York if the strict social-distancing measures
implemented are combined with a face-masks strategy, using a moderately-effective mask (with efficacy of about
50%) if only 30% of the residents of the state wear the masks. The masks use compliance needed to eliminate the
disease nationwide, under this scenario with strict social-distancing nationwide, is a mere 10%.
In summary, our study suggests that, like in the case of the other Coronaviruses we have seen in the past (namely
SARS and MERS [10]), COVID-19 is a disease that appears to be controllable using basic non-pharmaceutical in-
terventions, particularly social-distancing and the use of face-masks in public (especially when implemented in
combinations). The factors that are obviously critically-important to the success of the anti-COVID-19 control ef-
forts are the early implementation (and enhancement of effectiveness) of these intervention measures, and ensuring
their high adherence/coverage in the community.
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